[via Online Papers in Philosophy]
“Michael Glanzberg”:http://web.mit.edu/philos/www/glanzberg.html and “Susanna Siegel”:http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/. “Policing and Presupposition in Complex Demonstratives”:http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/cds/cdm.pdf. Also available in “html”:http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/cds/cd.html (no footnotes in html version)
bq. We argue that in classic perceptual uses of that F, the nominal F plays what we call a “policing role” with respect the proposition semantically expressed by utterances in which the use occurs: roughly speaking, no proposition is semantically expressed by an utterance of That F is G if no contextually appropriate object is F. We argue for this on grounds that are independent of whether complex demonstratives are quantificational, referring expressions, or something else. (The draft posted here is a revised version of the draft posted in January. Comments are still welcome).
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This entry was posted by fintel on Sunday, March 23rd, 2003, at 7:50 am.
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