“Mitchell Green”:http://www.people.virginia.edu/~msg6m/. Grice’s Frown: On Meaning and Expression, in G. Meggle and C. Plunze (eds.)
bq. I argue first that reflexive communicative intentions are not necessary for conversational implicature. Next, the Gricean framework for speaker meaning will be used to throw into relief a pervasive feature of communication that is invoked in a wide variety of philosophical discussions (as well as in the arts, in social psychology, psycholinguistics, and linguistics) but little explicated, namely the notion of expression. That notion is then shown to be important for another area of inquiry than that of implicature, particularly for our account of the phenomenon of Moorean absurdity. Finally, I argue that the notion of expression, construed as intentionally and overtly showing one’s intentional state, is a core concept in terms of which conversational implicature may be understood.
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