Philosophy Moves

In the spooky way that he has, Brian Leiter announces two pieces of philosophy faculty news involving the Cambridge scene, seemingly before the mere thought had even begun to speculate about the merest possibility of crossing the principal’s minds [*]:

bq. Philosophers Langton & Holton moving from Edinburgh to MIT
Rae Langton (Kant, feminist philosophy, moral and political philosophy, metaphysics), the Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, and Richard Holton (ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, philosophy of law), also at Edinburgh, have accepted senior offers from MIT. That’s a setback for Edinburgh, which recently lured Andy Clark from Indiana/Bloomington to the Chair in Logic and Metaphysics. It’s also, of course, a significant addition for the small, but strong MIT Department and, among many other things, will make MIT the leading center of feminist philosophy in the United States (Langton will join Sally Haslanger at MIT).
Harvard Junior Faculty in Philosophy Being Pursued: Gillies Going, Siegel with Offer
Anthony Gillies (epistemology, philosophy of language, decision theory), currently on tenure-track at Harvard, has accepted a tenure-track offer from the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. In addition, the University of Arizona has made a tenure-track offer to Susanna Siegel (philosophy of mind and language), also on tenure-track currently at Harvard.

While I am happy that my colleagues in the philosophy section were able to successfully recruit Rae and Richard, I am devastated that Thony is leaving town. His year here was very enjoyable for me — we have been meeting weekly at Burdick’s to chat about matters modal and related issues, which has recently resulted in nascent work on epistemic modals and distributed knowledge.

Present Indicative Counterfactuals

In the comments on my “If you’re Lance Armstrong …” post, Thony Gillies points out that this Hubie Brown-type conditional is a special case of the sportscasterese present indicative counterfactual conditional. As in (topical example from today’s Red Sox game, after Manny Ramirez made a spectacular catch running into the Green Monster in the 9th inning, protecting a slim Sox lead):

“If Ramirez doesn’t catch that, it’s a double and the tying run is in scoring position.”

Apropos my little working paper from 1990 on The Presupposition of Subjunctive Conditionals, I had a brief email exchange with Larry Horn about this kind of conditional. Here are some passages from my main message to Larry and his responses:

At 4:06 PM -0400 5/22/98, Kai von Fintel wrote:

Dear Larry —

thanks for your message. As an absolutely incorrigible sports addict, I have been struck by this construction many times. [It first struck me at the same time when I realized that the NFL was using instant replay to ascertain the truth of such counterfactuals as "If Sanders hadn't pushed Rice, he would have come down inbounds".]

Actually, upon further review I do not agree with your assessment:

[Larry had tried to convince me that "The existence of this construction clearly forces the severance of grammatical mood from the semantico-pragmatics of counterfactuality. There's no presupposition, conventional implicature, whatever, in these cases of indicative "if p (then) q" that p is epistemically possible."]

1. First possible response (not one I would be attracted to): this construction is ungrammatical, these guys are confused. Hence nothing follows about grammar.

Serious question: this seems much more localized to sportscasters than for example the reporter’s simple present, which also surfaces in stage directions and other circumstances (which has led people to actually propose funky semantic analyses of this use of the simple present). How widespread is this counterfactual indicative?

[Larry responded: "That is an interesting question. I'll raise it on ADS-L, where we had an earlier discussion of the PICFC (as I'll abbreviate the construction), since this would be an interesting sort of isogloss. All other cases of sportscasterese (not just the "shazam historical present" that Erich Woisetschlaeger and John Goldsmith discussed a decade or two back, but also e.g. the extension of certain currency descriptions for other uses: "he's hitting a buck fifty"; "there's a buck ten left in the quarter"; "a cornerback weighing a buck seventy-five taking down a tank like Ironhead!") or sportsplayerese ("my bad") are attested elsewhere, but I haven't come across PICFCs outside of SportsWorld."]

2. Second possible response (somewhat more believable, but still not great): these are run-of-the-mill indicative conditionals with a presumption of epistemic possibility. They would receive an analysis along the lines of the historical present tense, whatever that may be. Something like: “present” with respect to a temporarily assumed/imagined speech time (which is actually in the past of the real speech time), “epistemically possible” with respect to a temporarily assumed/imagined epistemic state (which is actually one that the speaker knows s/he’s not in (anymore)). This is the kind of move that I report in my subjunctive paper as the move favored by Portner for why some “subjunctives” do not seem straightforwardly “counterfactual”, according to him they are counterfactual but only with respect to a temporarily assumed point of view.

3. Third possible response (perhaps the one I would spend most energy on if I were to expand my paper to include discussion of this construction): I say in my paper that indicatives do not actually carry any direct presupposition/implicature. Subjunctives do. And it is the choice of an indicative over a subjunctive that may usually be interpreted as indicating epistemic possibility. In other words, subjunctives are marked and only good for uses where (at least some) worlds outside the set of epistemically possible worlds are quantified over. Indicatives are unmarked and thus in principle usable in many more circumstances; but of course usual considerations will limit their use.

There’s possibly quite a lot more to say about this construction. For example, one might wonder whether it could be used in the Anderson-type argument:

“If he had taken arsenic, he would show exactly these symptoms.”

This is impossible in a normal indicative:

“??If he took arsenic, he shows exactly these symptoms.”

But now imagine a sportscaster who hasn’t paid much attention to what is happening peripherally to the game. Rodman totally flips out and throws the ball at some spectators. Now, one thing that would explain his behavior is that he was heckled. Can our sportscaster say:

“If Rodman is heckled by the guy, he does exactly this. So, perhaps he was heckled.”

[Larry replied: "Funny you should bring these up. On the example-laden scrap paper I was typing my message from, I had an observation to the effect that Anderson-type non-CF contexts are impossible with PICFCs, but then I started to doubt the conclusion, although my Andersonesque examples weren't as convincing as yours. Another context would be the SportsCenter replay: Dan Patrick says Rodman should be suspended for his antics, but Kenny Mayne points out that they don't have complete footage of what preceded the incident--after all, [your PICFC here].”]

Anyway, thanks again for your message. If I expand the paper for publication in a journal, I will try to take this construction into account.

which I never did. I did however discover recently that Rich Thomason has been reading that working paper with his philosophy of language class, with a list of reading questions for his students. While I deduce from his questions that he finds the paper deficient, that would not appear to be fatal for something that never moved beyond working paper status. Maybe I’ll reconsider it some time soon.

Update I double-checked the archives of the ADS-L list, but no new insights into this constructions seem to have turned up, except the tip that David Carkeet, author of various novels with a linguist hero, mentioned the construction in a New York Times “On Language” column on July 22, 2000.

If you’re Lance Armstrong, …

If you’re Lance Armstrong, why, exactly, do you feel the need to go for Tour de France title No. 6?

I cite this line here not because I am a fan — which I am — but because it’s a weird conditional set-up, which is actually quite common in sports reporting, I believe. I know that Hubie Brown — once a successful coach, then a basketball color guy, now back coaching the Memphis Grizzlies — is very fond of the construction: “Now, if you’re Phil Jackson, you want to preserve your final time-out …”.

I guess it’s a device to involve the audience in the thought processes of the subject of the discourse. It would be interesting to relate this to the ongoing research on counterpart relations in attitude contexts, going back to George Lakoff’s famous Brigitte Bardot sentence: “I dreamed I was Brigite Bardot and that I kissed me”. See for example two papers by Orin Percus and Uli Sauerland.

Tangentially related: a paper advertised a few days ago by Brian Weatherson:

Michael Fara and Timothy Williamson, “Counterparts and Actuality”.
The language of quantified modal logic needs an “actuality” operator to represent many modal claims of natural language. But David Lewis’s counterpart theory can be neither extended nor revised to accommodate such an operator. Accordingly counterpart theory should be rejected as a way of understanding modality.

There is already some commentary on wo’s weblog.

Snippets 8 (February 2004) online

“Snippets”:http://www.ledonline.it/snippets/, the online journal of short and sweet linguistics squibs, has their “February 2004 issue”:http://www.ledonline.it/snippets/allegati/snippets800.pdf online, with these papers:

  • Daniel Altshuler. A simultaneous perception of things: SOT in Russian
  • Sarah Felber, Dorian Roehrs. *So weird a baffling construction
  • Stefan Müller. Complex NPs, subjacency, and extraposition
  • Mark Volpe. Affected object unergatives
  • Edoberto Zamparelli. On the thickness of plurals
  • Ed Zoerner. Gapping of copular be and [Spec, CP]

The journal is still accepting submissions to Snippets 9.

[Petition] ASL at BU

Carol Neidle writes from Boston University:

bq. Hello everyone,
I thought you might be interested to know about the latest political struggle at Boston University: for recognition of American Sign Language in fulfillment of the university’s “foreign language requirement.” There has been an astounding degree of ignorance and prejudice underlying the university’s unwavering position on this issue.
There is a Web site with information about what is going on http://www.bu.edu/asllrp/fl/ as well as an online petition (started by an undergraduate) accessible from that site.
Any support you might be able to offer — signing the online petition and/or offering a brief statement of support for our Web site — would be very much appreciated.
Thanks in advance.
With best wishes,
Carol

While the petition says that only affiliates of BU are eligible to sign, according to Carol, “The petition was originally intended for affiliates of BU, but people from all over have been signing it … and I believe that the student can no longer modify the wording on the petition Web site. In fact, anyone can sign.”

Speas on Evidentials

Peggy Speas (with Carol Tenny). “Evidential Paradigms, World Variables and Person Agreement Features”:http://www.umass.edu/linguist/people/faculty/speas/worldagr.pdf. to appear in special issue of the Italian Journal of Linguistics. This version here is a draft, and is more or less what was presented at GURT 2004, April 27, Georgetown University.

bq. Person marking spells out the relation between a given argument and a discourse role. It has long been observed that agreement paradigms spell out a very restricted subset of the logically-possible discourse roles, and that person features are hierarchically organized. (See Benveniste 1956, Harley and Ritter 2002.) In this paper, I will explore the idea that these restrictions on agreement have a parallel in the domain of evidential morphemes. I will argue that evidential morphemes are person agreement morphemes. I claim that evidential agreement paradigms specify the same restricted set of syntax-discourse relations as standard nominal agreement, but the argument specified by evidential agreement is a “world argument” rather than a nominal argument. The presence of a world argument in syntax will be supported by showing that worlds have syntactic properties parallel to those of entities (pronouns) and times (tenses). I will show how this view clarifies the relationship between modals and evidentials, and suggests interesting ways of restricting the inventory of possible projections in the left periphery of the clause.

Birds Share Language Gene with Humans

[via the "Scientific American":http://www.sciam.com/print_version.cfm?articleID=000C79B4-EA89-1069-AA8983414B7F0000]

From a UCLA press release:

bq. UCLA scientists report parallels between human speech and the song of a bird, findings that may contain clues to human speech disorders.
The research by a team led by Stephanie White, UCLA assistant professor of physiological science, supports the theory that two genes shared by humans and songbirds, FoxP1 and FoxP2, may play a critical role in human speech, and speech disorders.

The research on the FoxP1 and FoxP2 genes is reported in “a paper”:http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5589-03.2004 in the March 31, 2004 issue of the Journal of Neuroscience, see also this “companion paper”:http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4369-03.2004 in the same issue.

Update: Mark Liberman blogs about this work over at “Language Log”:http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/000716.html. Among other things, he reports on some earlier work on FoxP2, in particular Enard et.al., who argue that FoxP2 has changed relatively recently among humans (hints of the emergence of the language faculty?):

bq. FoxP2 “has been the target of selection during recent human evolution”, and that the hominid innovations in this gene occured “during the last 200,000 years of human history, that is, concomitant with or subsequent to the emergence of anatomically modern humans”. A word of caution: according to their model, the most likely time since the innovation is 0 years; they indulge in a certain amount of hand-waving to re-interpret this as “during the last 200,000 years”.

By the way, that’s quite some hand-waving (to get from 0 years to during the last 200,000 years). This is what we in the semantic trade would call the Extended Now.

Geurts and van der Sandt respond

Bart Geurts and Rob van der Sandt have prepared “a response”:http://www.kun.nl/phil/tfl/bart/papers/focusagain.pdf to “the peer commentaries”:http://semantics-online.org/2004/02/updateopenpeerreviewgeurtsandvandersandtonfocus on their paper “Interpreting focus”:http://www.kun.nl/phil/tfl/bart/papers/focus.pdf.

Bart Geurts and Rob van der Sandt. “Interpreting focus again”:http://www.kun.nl/phil/tfl/bart/papers/focusagain.pdf. To appear in Theoretical Linguistics.

bq. How to respond to such a fine collection of commentaries which are, without exception, thorough, to the point, constructive, and full of suggestions for improvement? The best response by far would be a radical overhaul of the target article–but that is against the rules. The next-best thing would be a page-by-page discussion of each commentary separately–which the editor wouldn’t allow. So we have no choice but to make a selection of the many good points that have been raised, and hope against hope that we will manage not to distort them too much.

Visiting Semantics Job at Rutgers

bq. The department of linguistics at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick Campus has a one-year position at the assistant professor level for academic year 2004-05. Applicants must have a Ph.D. by August 2004, with a specialization in Semantics. Duties will include teaching four classes, two in semantics and two in general linguistics. The salary will be $42,000. Applications should be received by April 27, 2004. Please send a curriculum vitae, a brief statement of research interests, samples of research, and three letters of recommendation to: Linguistics Search Committee, Department of Linguistics, Rutgers University, 18 Seminary Place, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1184. Rutgers University is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer. We welcome applications from all qualified individuals.
Address for Applications:
Attn: Search Committee 18 Seminary Place Department of Linguistics New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1184 United States of America
Applications are due by 27-Apr-2004
Contact Information:
Mark Baker Email: mabaker@ruccs.rutgers.edu Tel: 732-932-7140 Fax: 732-932-1370 Website: http://ling.rutgers.edu

[Thanks to Luca Storto for alerting me to this position. I will continue to publicize visiting semantics positions on the blog.]

Visiting Semantics Job at Georgetown

[Via Paul Portner:]

bq. The Linguistics Department at Georgetown University invites applications for a Visiting Assistant Professor position in SEMANTICS, SYNTAX/SEMANTICS INTERFACE, or SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS INTERFACE. Interest in Spanish or Portuguese linguistics is a plus. This position will be for at least one semester, and possibly both semesters, of the 2004-2005 academic year. Teaching responsibilities are two courses per semester.
For more information on the department, see: http://www.georgetown.edu/departments/linguistics/
To apply, please send a CV and contact information of three references. For full consideration, materials should arrive by April 15. Both regular mail (address below) or electronic submissions (pdf or rtf formats only) are acceptable:
Paul Portner Attention: Semantics Position Department of Linguistics Georgetown University Washington, DC 20057 USA
email: portnerp@georgetown.edu