Saka Challenges Truth-Conditional Semantics

Paul Saka, University of Houston: “The Argument From Ignorance Against Truth-Conditional Semantics”

According to epistemic versions of truth-conditional semantics, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth - conditions. Against such views I argue that we typically do not know the truth - conditions of the sentences we understand. We do not know the truth - conditions for vacuous-reference definite descriptions, non-declaratives, subjunctive conditionals, causal ascriptions, belief ascriptions, probability statements, figurative language, category mistakes, normative judgments, or vague statements. Appealing to tacit knowledge does not help, for we are not merely unable to articulate complete truth - conditions; even given full knowledge of a single world condition, we are often unable to tell whether a given sentence would be true or false. This makes it hard to say that knowledge of meaning is even tacit knowledge of truth - conditions.

[via Online Papers in Philosophy — thanks Brian!]