What is Presupposition Accommodation, Again?

In October, I will participate in the Ohio State University Workshop on Presupposition Accommodation. I was asked to write a paper on accommodation that David Beaver & Henk Zeevat and Zoltán Szabó will be commenting on. The paper was supposed to look at accommodation from a semantic perspective. What I have actually done is to update and expand my 2000 manuscript on accommodation. The paper is thus more of a foundational paper. I try to clarify what part of the job is to be done by semantics and what part by various parts of pragmatics or general purpose reasoning. The semanticist can now get back to the task of solving the projection problem. Thus, this paper is similar in intent to my paper on the role of truth-value judgments in the theory of presuppositions: “Would You Believe It? The King of France is Back!”. There I argue that the primary problem for semantics to solve is the projection problem, while the mapping between semantics and truth-value judgments is far too indirect to serve as empirical bedrock for a theory of presupposition.

In any case, a rough draft of the new paper is now available. I would very much appreciate any comments and criticism.